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Abstract
This paper reports an experimental test of how, when observing others' actions,
participants learn more than just information that the others have. We use a setting
where all information is public and where subjects face two kinds of information sets:
(1) the information that is necessary and su±cient for them to payo®-maximize and
(2) the decisions of previous players. We show that by observing the second type
of information subjects learn how to improve their own decision-making process.
Speci¯cally, the accurate players make small errors no matter what information set
they face whereas the inaccurate players perform much better when the decisions of
others are public.
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11 Introduction
In many economic settings, agents are imperfectly and asymmetrically informed. In these
cases, one can often bene¯t from learning whatever information others hold by observing
their actions. This idea is the basis for the social learning literature (see the surveys by Gale
(1996) and Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003)) and the majority of the literature on asset pricing
under asymmetric information (see Brunnermeier (2001)). However, seeing other agents'
decisions is likely to impact one's own decisions along other important dimensions. For
instance, inaccurate decision-makers may be able to improve their decision process when
they can observe how others have solved the problem at hand. We test this conjecture
in the laboratory and show that subjects learn to Bayesian-update more accurately when
others' updates are public.
We follow the classic ball-and-urn setting of Anderson and Holt (1997)1 with three
main innovations. In Anderson and Holt (1997), participants sequentially have to decide,
given private draws and the decisions of previous players, which one of two urns of known
ball composition has been chosen. The ¯rst important innovation in our setting is that
we ask players to estimate the probability that one of two urns has been chosen. Their
decisions are therefore a variable between 0 and 1. This continuous-action set allows us to
distance ourselves from possible herding e®ects and information cascades.
The second innovation is the treatment variable, which is the information revealed
to players when making their decision. Players always observe their own draw. However,
in one variant, they also observe all past draws of the previous players. In another, they
observe all previous draws and all previous estimates. And in the last one, they observe
all previous estimates. The third innovation consists in asking each subject to give two
estimates: once before seeing her own draw and once after. The ¯rst decision is therefore
based on the same information set as the previous player. It will allow us to distinguish
ex-ante between accurate and inaccurate players, before they see any new information.
1Anderson and Holt (1997) used their setting to show that herding and information cascades can be
generated in the laboratory.
2The variant where only all previous draws are made public is our benchmark. The
decisions that subjects make in this case rely only on their abilities to give accurate es-
timates based on available fundamental information, the draws. Our main result is that
if a participant is not very skilled, then observing others' estimates along with the actual
draws may help them give more accurate Bayesian estimates. Furthermore, when only
observing others' actions and not the actual draws, we show that subjects learn to make
better decisions when they have already solved the decision-making problem with public
draws and actions. Lastly, subjects do learn to perform better the longer they face the
decision problem.
The important point underlying the above result is that the learning process that
happens when observing others' actions is particularly important for the inaccurate players.
The accurate ones are indi®erent between seeing only draws and seeing draws and decisions
since they are con¯dent in their own decision making. It is the more inaccurate players that
learn from observing the actions of the other players, leading to better Bayesian-updating.
Neo-classical economics relies on the assumption that all economic agents solve their
optimization problems accurately. Numerous deviations from this assumption have been
shown in the literature (Odean (1998) among others) and recent models often include
noise or liquidity-motivated agents to account for these departures from rationality (for
instance DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990)). However, this solution is
very unappealing since these unskilled market participants remain unskilled, are driven
out of the market, and other ones replace them. Our result directly addresses this issue by
showing that inaccurate subjects do learn from observing the actions of others, leading to
a decrease in errors. It is very important for the literature to address this issue and take
into account the fact that inaccurate agents can learn to be accurate.
32 Experimental Design
2.1 Setting
The experiment was run at the Experimental Social Science Laboratory (XLab) at the
University of California, Berkeley. The 30 subjects recruited for this experiment were all
undergraduate students from di®erent majors. To the best of our knowledge, they had
never participated in a social learning experiment before, and they were not allowed to
participate twice in this experiment.
In each session, 5 subjects participated as decision-makers. They were asked to read
the instructions (see Appendix A) which were also read out loud by the experimenter at
the same time. The anonymity of the subjects was preserved throughout the experiment.
We also isolated the subjects from each other as much as possible by making them sit at
every other desk, by having physical partitions between the desks, and by preventing them
from talking.
Each session consisted of 2 sets of 10 independent and identical rounds in which all
5 subjects participated. At the beginning of each round, the 5 participants were randomly
placed in a queue (i.e. a sequence of 5 turns). The participants played sequentially ac-
cording to the queue given for that round, and the queue in one round was independent of
the queue in all other rounds.
At the beginning of each round, one of two urns (X or Y) was selected at random via
a coin °ip. The participants did not know which urn was chosen but were aware that the
probability of urn X being chosen is equal to the probability of urn Y being chosen. The
composition of each urn is common knowledge (see Figure 1). Five balls were drawn with
replacement from the chosen urn, one for each participant in the queue.
Upon being called to participate in a particular round, a subject was presented with
some information about the previous turns of the round and was asked to assign a proba-
bility P(X) 2 [0;1] to the event that urn X was chosen. However, each player was asked
to give their probability estimate of urn X being chosen twice: once before seeing the draw
4Figure 1: The physical setup
corresponding to their turn and once after seeing the draw corresponding to their turn.
In addition to their own draw, the information from previous turns provided to the
subjects is the treatment variable. It takes on one of the following three variants:
² Variant 1 (V1): All previous draws and all previous estimates are public
² Variant 2 (V2): All previous draws are public
² Variant 3 (V3): All previous estimates are public
where the estimates observed are always the ones made by the previous players after seeing
their own draw.
We ran 6 sessions. In each session, the ¯rst 10 rounds followed one variant and the
next 10 rounds followed another variant (see Table 1 for details). This is a within-subject
design and it allowed is to control for the order e®ect by balancing the set of sessions. Each
session lasted 1.5 hours total, including reading the instructions and paying the subjects.
Each subject was paid a $5 participation fee and subsequent earnings for their deci-
sions. Turn-by-turn earnings were determined according to the commonly used quadratic
scoring rule, which is incentive compatible under risk-neutrality (see Appendix B for a de-
tailed discussion of the experimental setting and of the payment scheme). In each round,
all subjects were paid for either their before-draw estimate or their after-draw estimate
according to a coin °ip. The average total earning per subject was $27 with a minimum
5Session # # of subjects # of rounds per variant Variant order
1 5 10 V1, V2
2 5 10 V1, V3
3 5 10 V2, V1
4 5 10 V3, V1
5 5 10 V3, V2
6 5 10 V2, V3
Table 1: Experimental Sessions
of $23 and a maximum of $31.
2.2 Time-Series Example
To provide some more intuition for the exact experimental procedure, we discuss one
particular trajectory (see Figure 2), which is of type V1, where previous participants'
draws and forecasts were announced.
Figure 2: Sample trajectory
Session 1, round 3, variant 1: players see all previous draws and all previous estimates.
The true urn was X.
The ¯rst player, having no information whatsoever, gave a correct prior of P(X) =
60:5.2 He then saw a black draw and updated his forecast to P(X) = 0:3, which is very close
to the Bayesian prediction of 1/3. The second player then did not make any changes to the
¯rst player's forecast and gave a prior of 0.3. After seeing his own black draw, he updated
to P(X) = 0:2, which is exactly equal to the Bayesian forecast. The third player then gave
a prior estimate of 0.3, which di®ers from the second player's assessment. Nevertheless,
after seeing his own white ball, he updated almost correctly back to 0.3. The fourth player
then gave an extreme prior forecast of 0 but after seeing his own white draw, he updated to
0.4. Concluding the round, the ¯fth player modi¯ed the fourth player's forecast by giving
a prior of 0.5. Then, he gave an extreme forecast of 1.0 after seeing a white draw. The
true urn was indeed X in this particular example.
In this trajectory, subjects exhibited updating that is at least partially Bayesian. We
will explore more general patterns in the empirical section.
3 Theory
3.1 Equilibrium and Null Hypothesis
We de¯ne the equilibrium of the decision problem underlying our experimental design as
the Bayesian solution. For the purpose of this derivation, we will focus on V1 and only
on the responses rt of the subjects, but the same analysis applies to the other cases. The
uninformed prior is P(X) = 0:5 since each urn is equally likely to be picked. Following the
observation of her corresponding draw, Bayes' rule for the ¯rst player gives:






P(d1jX) ¢ P(X) + P(d1jY ) ¢ P(Y )
=
2=3 ¢ 1=2




if d1 is white (2)
or








if d1 is black. (3)
This Bayesian updating is then repeated at the second turn, with the new prior P(X) equal
to one of the above responses. As a result, after observing 2 white draws, the Bayesian
response is 0.8; after 2 black draws it is 0.2; and after 1 white and 1 black3 it is 0.5. Exactly
the same process can be repeated for all combinations of draws for all 5 turns.
Under the assumption of common knowledge of rationality and Bayesian updating,
the three variants of the game are equivalent, i.e. the players should behave in exactly the
same fashion. The equivalence between V1 and V2 is straightforward since in both settings,
all players observe all previous draws. Furthermore V3 is also equivalent to the other two.
Indeed, if the ¯rst player observes a white ball, then she will forecast P(X) = 2=3, which
allows the second player to perfectly back out the fact that a white ball was drawn. The
same reasoning applies for all turns, leading to exactly the same results. Therefore, we can
formulate our null hypothesis as:
H0 = Under the assumption of common knowledge of rationality, all
three variants are equivalent.
3.2 Alternative Hypothesis
There are two information sets in the experiment: the draws and the responses. Under
the null, they are redundant. However, it should be clear that the assumption used in
formulating the null is very strong. We can therefore expect the null to be rejected in the
data.
A realistic alternative takes into account the fact that players are possibly boundedly
rational. On the one hand, if players are accurate at Bayesian updating, then seeing the
draws is su±cient and the responses are redundant. On the other hand, if players are not
very accurate Bayesians, then the responses are not redundant anymore. This alternative
3The order of the draws is irrelevant.
8leaves the door open for potential learning from observing others' decisions, beyond learning
their information since the draws are public. The intuition underlying this alternative is
that agents focus on the type of information that is better suited to their processing skills.
There are other alternatives that we chose not explore even though our experimental
setting speaks to them: dynamics of the propagation of errors, overcon¯dence (Kogan
(2005)), impact of the increasing complexity of the game, etc.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Notation
Figure 3 is a schematic diagram of the dynamics of the game, in which we de¯ne the
variables to be used in our empirical analysis. As of now, we will call the two probability
estimates that each player gives as the the prior pt (before the draw) and the response rt
(after the draw). Each draw dt corresponds to an optimal Bayesian response bt. First, we
Figure 3: Schematic Dynamics of the Game
de¯ne the error in et as the di®erence between the actual response of the player at turn t
and the optimal Bayesian response. Second, the di®erence between the prior given by the
player at turn t and the response of the previous player is de¯ned as the update ut. Third,
the error in the update eut of the player at turn t is given by the di®erence between his
prior and the optimal Bayesian of the previous turn.
9Under our null hypothesis, all three variables et, ut, and eut should be equal to zero
for all variants and all turns. We will show that the null is rejected but the patterns of
deviations from the null allow us to shed light on the learning behavior of the participants.
4.2 Are Players Accurate Bayesian Estimators?
As previously mentioned, under the assumption of common knowledge of rationality, the
equilibrium outcome of the game is that each player gives the Bayesian estimate corre-
sponding to its turn given the draws that he has seen so far (or given the draws that he
can extract from the previous players' forecasts). How does this equilibrium prediction fare
with the data? We show in this section that errors are signi¯cantly di®erent from zero and
that subjects do not Bayesian update. Also, the between-turn updating is also signi¯cant
in size but not in accuracy.
4.2.1 Errors
As a measure of the average error rate, we use the average absolute deviation of the














where V i is the type of variant, t is the turn number, and N is the total number of rounds
per variant (= 40). Under the null hypothesis, ¹ e should be equal to 0 for all three variants
and across all turns. The results are shown in Table 2.4
First, we notice that all coe±cients are statistically signi¯cant.5 This con¯rms the
fact that players are on average not very accurate Bayesian estimators. Indeed, out of a
total 600 responses, only 14% are equal to the Bayesian estimate.6 This simple statistic
4We do not include the error in priors in this analysis even though for V1 and V2, giving a prior is
equivalent to giving a response based on the pervious player's information.
5The t-statistics are in°ated since the observations are not independent. The errors are likely to be
correlated across rounds, for instance due to learning.
6All of these mistake-free responses are made in turns 2 and 4, where it rational to give a 0.5 prediction
10Variant Turn 1 Turn 2 Turn 3 Turn 4 Turn 5
V1 0.1617 0.1075 0.1019 0.0903 0.0875
(7.53)*** (5.36)*** (7.86)*** (4.43)*** (6.77)***
V2 0.115 0.13 0.1183 0.0725 0.1167
(6.83)*** (5.07)*** (9.84)*** (6.40)*** (4.76)***
V3 0.1075 0.1525 0.15 0.1357 0.1882
(5.58)*** (6.35)*** (8.83)*** (7.77)*** (8.24)***
Table 2: Average Absolute Deviation from the Bayesian Estimate
The average error in etimation ¹ e is calculated as the average of the absolute value of the
di®erence between the response and the true Bayesian estimate. This is done for each
variant and for each turn separately. The tested null is that these average errors are equal
to zero. The associated one-sided t-statistics are shown in brackets. *, **, and *** denote
signi¯cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
should be adjusted since almost all players round their estimates to the nearest decimal, for
instance 0.3 after seeing 1 black draw when the Bayesian estimate is 1/3. De¯ning the no-
error zone as [¡0:03;0:03], 30% of the forecasts can be considered accurate. Furthermore,
if we expand the error-free zone to [¡0:06;0:06], then 45% of the forecasts are accurate.
This number suggests that our sample can be divided into two halves, an accurate-Bayesian
half and an inaccurate-Bayesian half.
A time-series look at Table 2 shows that in V1, ¹ e monotonically decreases across turns.
This is also the overall trend in V2. However, in V3, ¹ e almost seems to increase across
rounds. This supports the intuition that V3 presents participants with a substantially
more complex problem: the nature of the draws needs to be extracted from the responses
of the previous players. Either the participants are successful at correctly extracting that
information, given that others' responses are at least directionally correct, or errors may
aggregate across turns, leading to very large deviations from the Bayesian forecast.7
after having seen an equal number of white and black draws, which can only happen in turns 2 and 4.
Players also sometimes correctly estimate 0.2 after 2 black draws or 0.8 after 2 white draws, both of which
can only happen at the second turn. At the fourth turn, the same thing can happen if the two other draws
happen to o®set each other.
7A possible alternative hypothesis could be that the variance of the errors increases across turns.
However, tests were inconclusive.
11Looking across variants, it appears as if, expect for turn 1, V1 leads to smaller
mistakes than V2, which in turn leads to smaller mistakes than V3. At the ¯rst turn,
the three variants are exactly the same, suggesting that the large result in turn 1 of V1
is spurious. Indeed, we believe that it is mainly due to idiosyncratic behavior in the ¯rst
10 rounds of the ¯rst session: procedural \noise" such as not hiding the urn properly and
players trying to take advantage. Without the ¯rst half of session 1, the average absolute
error in turn 1 is 0.1011.
We formalize these di®erences across variants by calculating the di®erence in average
absolute errors between variants and by separating turns into two groups: early (2 and 3)
and late (4 and 5). Table 3 shows the results of these two-sample mean comparison tests.
Di®erence in Variant Turns 2 + 3 Turns 4 + 5
V1 - V2 -0.0194 -0.0057
(-1.06) (-0.31)
V1 - V3 -0.0465 -0.0731
(-2.47)*** (-3.87)***
V2 - V3 -0.0271 -0.0674
(-1.33)* (-3.37)***
Table 3: Di®erence in Error Between Variants for Early and Late Turns
The di®erence in average error ¹ e between two variants is simply the di®erence between the
quantities from Table 2. We grouped the turns in pairs de¯ned as early (turns 1 and 2)
and late (turns 3 and 4). The tested null is that these di®erences are equal to zero. The
associated one-sided t-statistics are shown in brackets. *, **, and *** denote signi¯cance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
The results in this table con¯rm the fact that players in V1 and V2 perform better
than the ones in V3, i.e. smaller errors. The di®erences are larger and more signi¯cant
in later turns, highlighting the impact of the increasing complexity of the game as turns
progress. The di®erence between V1 and V2 is not signi¯cant, even though the signs
suggest that V1 leads to smaller errors than V2.
The results in this section are robust to the order of the variants within the session
except for V3, a fact which will be explained in section 4.4.2. Also, if we de¯ne the error
12as the di®erence between the payment obtained by the player and the payment given by
the exact Bayesian estimate, we obtain qualitatively similar results. This is evidence that
our payment scheme is well suited to our research question.
4.2.2 Decision Model
The model that we will test in this section extends the fully rational Bayesian framework
by allowing for the possibility that the response given by the subject at turn t is a function
not only of the draws but also of the responses of the previous players. When the player at
turn t > 2 forms her optimal response rt, she estimates the probability of X having been
chosen based on the information that she has.8 In V1, her information set includes her
own draw dt plus all previous draws dt¡j and responses rt¡j. In V2, this set includes her
own draw and only the previous draws. In V3, it includes her own draw and all previous
































tains all draws, and It
r = ffrt¡j(¢)g
t¡1
j=1g, which contains all responses. According to our
null hypothesis, the information set that is necessary and su±cient for optimal individual
decision-making is It
d. However, it may be optimal for a player to rely on previous players'
estimates contained in It
r if she believes that she is actually not a very accurate estimator.
In order to test this very simple decision model, we ran a censored Tobit regression
for each variant and each turn, with the response rV i
t as the dependent variable and the
It
d and It
r corresponding to that turn and that variant as the independent variables.9 For
8Turn 1, as previously mentioned, is the same for all variants: the response is a function of the ¯rst
draw only.
9We did not di®erentiate the responses by player.
13estimation purposes, we have transformed the draws dt into a dummy variable: 1 for a
white draw and 0 for a black draw. Here are two of the regressions and all the others
follow the same pattern:
r
V 1
t=1 = ®1 + ¯1 ¢ d1 + "1 (8)
r
V 1
t=2 = ®2 + ¯2 ¢ d2 + ¯3 ¢ d1 + ¯4 ¢ r1 + "2: (9)
Theoretical Bayesian updating gives us a very clear prediction as to what the ¯ coe±cients
on the draws should be. For instance, in regression 8, the response should be 1/3 if the
draw is black and 2/3 if the draw is white. Since the d1 = 0 for a black draw and 1 for a
white draw, we can conclude that ®1 = 1=3 and ¯1 = 1=3. For regression 9, the theoretical
prediction is: ¯4 = 0, ®2 = 0:2 (two black draws gives 0.2), ¯2 = ¯3 = 0:3 (two white draws
give 0.8). Equivalent theoretical predictions can be obtained for every regression.
To summarize, we should observe a monotonic decrease across turns in the coe±cients
on all draws. The coe±cient on the responses in V1 should be zero. If extraction of the
nature of the draws is accurate, then the coe±cients on the responses in V3 should be
equal to the coe±cients on the draws in V1 and V2.
A censored regression model is required since the responses are bounded below by
0 and above by 1 but are continuous between these two points.10 We also ran a joint
regression with all responses and with dummy variables to control for the right-hand-side
variables. Despite a slight gain in power, the results are qualitatively the same. The results
of the 15 separate regressions are shown in Table 4.
The ¯rst thing to highlight is that the model performs very well, as shown by the
signi¯cance of all Â2 tests: we strongly reject the null that the responses would be better
explained by a constant.11
Second, we notice that the value of the constant does decrease across rounds for
10OLS is generally inconsistent over such a dataset since the errors are unlikely to be normally distributed.
11The large coe±cient obtained on dt in the V1, T1 regression is due to the same reasons explaining the























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































16all three variants. At the later turns, it becomes insigni¯cant, which agrees with our
theoretical prediction. However, the value of the constant is almost never equal to the
theoretical value.
In V1, we can see that the coe±cients on the responses are almost all equal to
zero, which is in agreement with the theory. However, the coe±cients on the draws di®er
drastically from their theoretical forecasts. The coe±cients on dt and dt¡1 do not really
decrease across turns. Moreover, the coe±cients on the draws of previous players actually
tend to become smaller as the turns progress. This suggests that more recent draws may
be viewed as su±cient statistics for the entire history of draws.
The same patterns appear in V2, although not as clearly. In this variant, subjects
are only observing the history of draws and can therefore only focus on their own decision-
making. As a result, the ¯ coe±cients on all draws are large.
In V3, the coe±cients are harder to interpret. The previous responses also give rise
to signi¯cant positive coe±cient on the responses. However, it looks as if the coe±cient
on the two most recent responses increases across rounds, suggesting that participants rely
heavily on these pieces of information when making their estimates.
Basically, this simple model extends the Bayesian framework by allowing responses
to be formed based on the actual information observed and not only the underlying fun-
damentals (the draws). We ¯nd more supporting evidence for the fact that subjects are
not very accurate Bayesians even though they have some notion of Bayesian updating.
4.2.3 Between-Turn Updating
One very important innovation in our setting is the fact that at each turn, participants
have to give two estimates of P(X): once before seeing her draw (the prior) and once after
(the response). Players have an incentive to give their best estimate of Urn X being chosen
in both cases since they know that there are as likely to paid for the accuracy of their prior
as well as for the accuracy of their response. We de¯ne the update made by players as the
di®erence between the prior at turn t and the response at turn t ¡ 1: ut = pt ¡ rt¡1 as
17was shown on Figure 3. Under the very strong assumptions of our null hypothesis, there
should be no updating since the responses of the previous players should be exactly equal
to the Bayesian estimates.
Let us use the following measure in order to assess how much players update across














where r(¢) is the posterior assessment of the player at a given turn after seeing her own
draw and p(¢) is the prior assessment of the next player before seeing her own draw. The
results are shown in Table 5.
Variant Turn 2 Turn 3 Turn 4 Turn 5
V1 0.2 0.1425 0.125 0.1325
(6.21)*** (6.47)*** (7.66)*** (5.55)***
V2 0.1063 0.15 0.1425 0.135
(5.05)*** (4.97)*** (7.68)*** (4.97)***
V3 0.1167 0.095 0.1075 0.1225
(6.84)*** (4.55)*** (7.00)*** (5.83)***
Table 5: Between-Turn Updating
The average between-turn updating is calculated as the average of the absolute value of
the di®erence between the prior of turn t and the response of turn t ¡ 1. This is done for
each variant and for each turn separately. The tested null is that ¹ u is equal to zero. The
associated one-sided t-statistics are shown in brackets. *, **, and *** denote signi¯cance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
In 34% of cases, players did not update and in 30% if these cases,12 they were right
not to update since the response of the previous player was correct. Therefore in at most
10% of cases are players skilled enough to notice an accurate response and not correct it. In
parallel with Section 4.2, we can also expand the bounds of the no-error zone to [-0.03;0.03],
12Players can only update if they are in turns 2 to 5. This gives us a total of 480 updates, distributed
evenly across all three variants.
18giving us 12% of perfect non-updates.13 These \perfect non-updates" only occur at turns
3 and 5, which is in agreement with the timing of the errors explained in Section 4.2.
All coe±cients are signi¯cant in Table 5. However, tests not shown do not allow us
to reject the null that the amount of updating is equal across turns and variants. This is
intriguing since in V2, the responses are not public. So in what sense do subjects update?
It appears as if in V1 and V2, participants tend to correct a little more than in V3.
This suggests that seeing the actual draws indeed leads to more changes. Furthermore, this
fact supports the intuitive idea previously mentioned that extracting the draws from the
response and making the appropriate change if necessary is indeed a di±cult task. Players
therefore are more likely to not update or update very little.












jpt(¢) ¡ bt¡1j ¡ jrt¡1(¢) ¡ bt¡1j
N
(11)
where, as before, p are the priors, r are the responses, and b are the theoretical Bayesian
forecasts for the given turn. We only take into account the turns where a between-turn
update was actually made. So conditional on there being an update of the previous player's
response, QV i
t < 0 if the prior is closer to the Bayesian and QV i
t ¸ 0 if the prior is further
away from the Bayesian. The results are shown in Table 6.
The insigni¯cance of most coe±cients can be interpreted as noise in updating: sub-
jects feel like they need to update but do so in a random fashion. Despite this, it seems
that V1 leads to slightly more accurate updating than V2 and V3. In V3, subjects do not
update very well, supporting the idea that either extracting the fundamental information
from the responses is not easy or the extraction is successful but the error of the previous
player still has an impact.
13We get a 17% result with the no-error zone expanded to [-0.06;0.06].
19Variant Turn 2 Turn 3 Turn 4 Turn 5
V1 -0.0469 -0.0259 0.0115 -0.0115
(-1.36)* (-0.68) (0.49) (-0.26)
V2 0.0771 -0.024 0.0199 0.0466
(2.20)** (-0.48) (0.86) (1.10)
V3 0.0381 -0.01 0.0163 0.0839
(1.46)* (-0.20) (0.73) (2.45)**
Table 6: Accuracy of the Between-Turn Updating
The accuracy is calculated as the di®erence between the absolute error in updating at turn
t and the absolute error at turn t ¡ 1, conditional on there being a non-zero updating by
the player at t. We then average across turns for each variant. We test the null hypothesis
that these di®erences are equal to zero. The associated one-sided t-statistics are shown in
brackets. *, **, and *** denote signi¯cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
4.3 Types of Players
As previously mentioned, there should be no between-turn updating under the null. We
showed in Section 4.2.3 that this null is easily rejected. Indeed, in a bounded rationality
setting, the response of the player at t ¡ 1 may or may not be accurate. If the player
at t is con¯dent in his ability to give accurate probabilistic estimates, i.e. the variance
on the quality of his mental model is small, then he will be able to distinguish between
these two situations. In the ¯rst case, he will not update since the response was accurate
and he knows it. In the second case, he will update and will give a more accurate prior.
However, if the player is not con¯dent in his mental model, then she will not know how to
distinguish between the two situations. The rational response is then not to update and
rely on the previous players' mental models, which are likely be more accurate since the
player considers himself as below average.
This updating process allows us to di®erentiate ex-ante, i.e. before responses are
formed, between accurate Bayesian estimators and inaccurate Bayesian estimators. We
will therefore associate a type to each decision-maker (in all variants) based on her update
process. The following list details the di®erent cases that are encountered, along with the
20conclusion in terms of type written in bold:
² Non-zero update ut 6= 0 (66%)
{ Accurate update Qt < 0 (27%) =) Accurate type
{ Inaccurate update Qt ¸ 0 (39%) =) Inaccurate type14
² No update ut = 0 (34%)
{ Previous response inaccurate et¡1 6= 0 (24%) =) Inaccurate type
{ Previous response accurate et¡1 = 0 (10%) =) Accurate or Inaccurate type.
The last case is inconclusive since we cannot di®erentiate between a rational inaccurate
player who is just following the previous player and a rational accurate player who is not
updating an accurate response. As a robustness check, all tests were run with the last case
considered as accurate or as inaccurate. The results are unchanged. We will present only
the results where we consider it as accurate.
For empirical implementation, we created a dummy variable for type: Itype = 1 if
accurate and = 0 if inaccurate. Table 7 shows the proportions of each type per variant.
Variant # of Inaccurate Type # of Accurate Type Total # of Observations
V1 90 70 160
V2 99 61 160
V3 112 48 160
Table 7: Frequency of Types Per Variant
There are more inaccurate types than accurate types, as expected after the results
obtained on the errors. The number of inaccurate types increases across variants, in agree-
ment with the fact that the decision-making process is hardest in V3 and harder in V2
than in V1.
14We include the case Qt = 0 as bad since it corresponds to a prior that is as far away from the Bayesian
estimate as the posterior, only on the other side.
21For robustness, we have also performed the sorting by type according to errors. Play-
ers making errors below the median error were classi¯ed as accurate. We obtained a 74%
match between the two kinds of sorting. Furthermore, we also classi¯ed with respect to
the mean error and obtained a 61% match.
A very general \test" of our ex-ante type classi¯cation consists of regressing absolute
errors jetj on the type dummy. The coe±cient on the dummy comes out negative and highly
signi¯cant. This result says that better types make smaller mistakes, which supports our
methodology.
4.4 Learning
De¯ning V2 as the benchmark where players can only rely on their own skills so as to solve
the estimation problem, we show in this section that when the decisions of others are made
public (V1), then players perform better. In particular, the inaccurate subjects learn to
perform much better whereas the accurate players perform just as well. Also, when V3 is
played second, we show that somehow, players perform much better in this di±cult variant
than when V3 is played ¯rst. Furthermore, learning does occur across rounds, especially
in V3 and V2 and again more so for the inaccurate players. This is indirect evidence that
in V1, inaccurate players learn to behave like accurate ones.
4.4.1 Across-Subject Learning
Accurate players should not rely on others' responses and should give rise to smaller mis-
takes, whereas inaccurate players are likely follow exactly the opposite pattern. In order




t j = ® + ¯ ¢ Itype + ": (12)
The results are shown in Table 8.








Table 8: Impact of Types on Errors
jeV i
t j = ® + ¯ ¢ Itype + "
jetj is the absolute error and Itype is a type dummy. This is done for each variant separately.
The t-statistics are shown in brackets. *, **, and *** denote signi¯cance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively.
Nevertheless, there is no di®erence in V1, suggesting that accurate and inaccurate players
perform as well in this particular variant where all draws and responses are public. It could
be that seeing the responses allows the inaccurate players to actually learn to perform
better.
Following on this intuition, we test whether players perform better when they start
seeing the responses of others, i.e. when they switch between playing V2 and V1. We know
that overall, there is no di®erence in errors between the two variants. However, Table 8
shows that accurate players perform signi¯cantly better than inaccurate ones in V3 and
V2, but not in V1. In order to ¯nd an answer to the riddle, we run the following regressions
on the data corresponding to V1 and V2:
je
accurate
t j = ® + ¯ ¢ IV 1 + "1 (13)
je
inaccurate
t j = ® + ¯ ¢ IV 1 + "2 (14)
where IV 1 is a dummy variable for V1. The results are shown in Table 9.
The results from these regression show that the accurate people do not do any better
or any worse when they observe the responses of others. However, the inaccurate players do






Table 9: Impact of Type on Learning from V2 to V1
je
type
t j = ® + ¯ ¢ IV 1 + "
jetj is the absolute error and IV 1 is a dummy for V1. This is done for each type separately.
The dataset only contains the rounds corresponding to V1 and V2. The t-statistics are
shown in brackets. *, **, and *** denote signi¯cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
learn how to improve their decision-making process. One could argue that they just start
following previous players. However, as we saw earlier, the sample is evenly divided between
accurate and inaccurate players (slight imbalance in favor of the inaccurate), which rules
out this alternative.
Similar results are obtained for the switches between V3 and V1, and V3 and V2,
as shown in Tables 10 and 11. The learning dynamics is almost entirely driven by the






Table 10: Impact of Type on Learning from V3 to V1
je
type
t j = ® + ¯ ¢ IV 1 + "
jetj is the absolute error and IV 1 is a dummy for V1. This is done for each type separately.
The dataset only contains the rounds corresponding to V1 and V3. The t-statistics are
shown in brackets. *, **, and *** denote signi¯cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
We want to see how the variant a®ects the rate in which subjects learn, i.e. can






Table 11: Impact of Type on Learning from V3 to V2
je
type
t j = ® + ¯ ¢ IV 1 + "
jetj is the absolute error and IV 2 is a dummy for V2. This is done for each type separately.
The dataset only contains the rounds corresponding to V2 and V3. The t-statistics are
shown in brackets. *, **, and *** denote signi¯cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
whether past errors explain current errors. If the current player is accurate, he will solve
his own decision process without being a®ected by the previous players. However, if he
is inaccurate, then he is likely to rely much more heavily on the forecasts of the previous




t = ® + ¯ ¢ et¡1 + " (15)






Table 12: Regression of Current Errors on Past Errors per Type
e
type
t = ® + ¯ ¢ et¡1 + "
et are current errors and et¡1 are past errors. This is done for each type separately. The
t-statistics are shown in brackets. *, **, and *** denote signi¯cance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively.
It is very clear that inaccurate types do rely on previous players' responses, leading
to a positive and signi¯cant correlation in errors across rounds. Accurate types are not
25subject to this bias, as shown by the insigni¯cance of the coe±cient on past errors in the
second regression. The former e®ect may appear as anchoring in the sense that observing
previous players' responses does lead in correlated mistakes. However, since it only appears
for inaccurate players and it is rational for them to rely on others' responses, we would like
to de¯ne this e®ect as \knowledge-based anchoring".
In Table 13, we test whether this result is robust to the change in variant by running
the above regression for each type and variant separately.
Type, Variant ® ¯
Inaccurate, V1 -0.0215 0.0805
(-1.53) (0.54)
Accurate, V1 0.0324 0.0415
(1.73)* (0.51)
Inaccurate, V2 0.0166 0.3037
(0.86) (1.77)*
Accurate, V2 -0.0022 -0.0457
(-0.16) (-0.67)
Inaccurate, V3 0.0190 0.8426
(1.07) (7.48)***
Accurate, V3 0.0179 0.1132
(1.00) (1.49)
Table 13: Regression of Current Errors on Past Errors per Type and Variant
e
type
t = ® + ¯ ¢ et¡1 + "
et are current errors and et¡1 are past errors. This is done for each type and variant
separately. The t-statistics are shown in brackets. *, **, and *** denote signi¯cance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
As was showed in Section 4.2, it is important to remember that, basically, the dis-
tribution of errors is indistinguishable from a normal distribution with mean 0. Moreover,
there is no statistical di®erence in average absolute errors across turns and across variants.
In V2, since only the draws are public, there is no chance for learning, and all coe±-
cients should come up as insigni¯cant, which they do.
In V3, subjects are forced to learn since they only see the forecasts. In that variant,
26since the errors are normally distributed, the errors for accurate types will be uncorrelated
with the previous player's error, as is supported in the data. However, inaccurate types
will rely heavily on the previous responses, leading to a signi¯cant positive coe±cient.
The intriguing fact is that ¯ is insigni¯cant for V1. We would like to argue that this
is indeed due to learning. Errors are uncorrelated since accurate and inaccurate types are
both playing \well". In V3, we showed that the inaccurate types do learn from seeing the
responses. As a result, it is not unrealistic to assume that the same process happens in
V1.
4.4.2 Within-Subject Learning
One important aspect of the learning process is whether subjects make less mistakes as
rounds progress. Especially if they see others' responses, it may allow them to improve their




t j = ® + ¯ ¢ R + ° ¢ Itype + ± ¢ R ¢ Itype + " (16)
where R is the round number (1 through 20). The results are shown in Table 14.
Variant ® ¯ ° ±
V1 0.1026 -0.0011 0.0419 -0.0030
(4.20)*** (-0.60) (1.19) (-0.98)
V2 0.1644 -0.0042 -0.0761 0.0042
(6.48)*** (-1.91)* (-1.80)* (1.22)
V3 0.2491 -0.0060 -0.1443 0.0043
(10.34)*** (-2.96)*** (-3.45)*** (1.24)
Table 14: Learning across Rounds and Type
jeV i
t j = ® + ¯ ¢ R + ° ¢ Itype + ± ¢ R ¢ Itype + "
jetj is the absolute error, R is the round number, and Itype is the type dummy. This is done
for each variant separately. The t-statistics are shown in brackets. *, **, and *** denote
signi¯cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
These results show the following learning e®ects. Even though barely not signi¯cant
27in V1 and V2, the three ¯ coe±cients are negative, showing that learning does in general
occur across rounds. The type has the same e®ect as previously shown: better types make
smaller mistakes. However, this e®ect is not present in V1 (and is almost signi¯cant in
V2). Indeed, in that case, we cannot distinguish between the e®ect of being a accurate
or inaccurate player. We can therefore conclude that seeing others' responses does help:
players do learn to perform better when they can \compare" their mental model with
others.15
As was mentioned in Section 4.2.1, the order of the variants within the sessions has
no impact on the results except for V3, as shown in Table 15.
Turn 1 Turn 2 Turn 3 Turns 4 Turn 5
V3 played ¯rst 0.1567 0.205 0.1878 0.1441 0.2389
(4.55)*** (5.96)*** (6.44)*** (5.27)*** (6.45)***
V3 played second 0.0583 0.1 0.1122 0.1274 0.1375
(6.48)*** (3.34)*** (8.29)*** (5.71)*** (6.15)***
V3 ¯rst - V3 second 0.0983 0.105 0.0756 0.0168 0.1014
(2.76)*** (2.30)** (2.35)** (0.48) (2.34)**
Table 15: Error in V3 when Played First or Second
The average error in etimation ¹ e is calculated as the average of the absolute value of the
di®erence between the response and the true Bayesian estimate. This is done for each
turn separately. The tested null is that these average errors are equal to zero. The last
row shows the test of di®erence in means between the previous two rows. The associated
one-sided t-statistics are shown in brackets. *, **, and *** denote signi¯cance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
The main result from this table is that subjects make signi¯cantly less mistakes when
they play V3 after having played another variant. This is our ¯rst evidence of learning:
subjects perform signi¯cantly better in the hardest variant of the game when they have
played one of the other two variants before. The result is unfortunately independent of
the variant played before (the coe±cients are insigni¯cant, mainly due to the small sample
15We reproduced Table 14 with only the inaccurate type and we obtain the same dynamics on ¯. The
e®ect disappears when only using the accurate type, supporting our claim that the learning is largely
driven by the inaccurate players.
28size), which leaves open the question as to whether subjects have indeed learned to be
better Bayesians when playing V1 ¯rst.
5 Conclusion
We use a ball-and-urn experimental setting to show that by observing others' decisions,
subjects can learn more than just the information of the previous players. In particular, we
show that players make more accurate decisions when they observe the decisions of others
in addition to the actual fundamental information, the draws. This improvement is almost
solely driven by the more inaccurate players who learn the most by observing how others
solved the problem at hand.
The answer to our research question, what can one learn from others beyond their
information, is however not complete. We are unable to exactly pin down how it is that
inaccurate players learn from observing others' decisions. It is reasonable to assume that
they place an estimate on the accuracy of previous players' estimates. Indeed, there is still
the open question as to how it is that inaccurate players become more accurate in V1. It is
possible that they estimate the accuracy of the previous players and rely on their responses
if the estimated accuracy is high.
In order to test how subjects learn about others and how this impacts their behavior,
our experimental design needs to be modi¯ed such that we can elicit beliefs regarding the
players' estimate of the accuracy of the previous players responses. For instance, we could
allow players to buy a signal informing them about the accuracy of these estimates. Indeed,
if inaccurate players know that they are playing after accurate ones, they are likely to learn
to make better decisions.
As mentioned in the introduction, our results speak directly to the idea that noise
traders in ¯nancial markets are either driven out of the market or learn to make better
decisions. This equilibrium is much more realistic than one with an in¯nite supply of




This is an experiment in decision-making. A research foundation has provided funds for
conducting this experiment.
Your earnings will depend partly on your decisions and partly on chance. If you
follow the instructions and make careful decisions, you may earn a considerable amount of
money. You will receive $5 as participation fee (simply for showing up on time). Details
of how you will make decisions and gain subsequent earnings will be provided below.
In this experiment, you will participate in 10 independent and identical (of the same
form) decision problems, labelled as rounds.
In every round, all participants make decisions one after the other (hereafter, line of
participants). In each decision problem, you will be randomly assigned a position in the
line of participants.
When you are being called to make your ¯rst decision you will be informed of your
position along the line of participants for the ¯rst decision problem. After all have par-
ticipated in the ¯rst decision problem, you will then be randomly placed in the line of
participants for the second decision problem. Again, upon being called to make your sec-
ond decision you will be informed of your position along the new line for the second decision
problem, and so on.
Your position along the line of participants of each decision problem depends solely
upon chance and is independent of your position along the line of participants of any other
decision problem.
Next, we will describe in detail the process that will be repeated in all 10 rounds.
Decision problem
Each decision problem starts with a coin °ip in order to select one of the two urns, X and
Y, both containing a number of white and black balls:
Urn X Urn Y
2 white balls 1 white ball
1 black ball 2 black balls
You WILL NOT be noti¯ed which urn was randomly selected. Rather, the chances
of Urn X being selected are equal to the chances of Urn Y being selected. After selecting
the urn, the experimenter will draw WITH REPLACEMENT ¯ve balls from that urn, in
the order corresponding to the line of participants.
It will be your task to decide HOW LIKELY IT IS THAT URN X WAS SELECTED.
In each decision problem, you will be asked to assess the probability that Urn X was selected
twice. First, BEFORE being noti¯ed of the ball color corresponding to your position along
the line of participants. Second, AFTER being noti¯ed of the ball color corresponding to
your position along the line of participants.
31For example, if you are the third participant in the ¯rst round, the sequence of events
is described below:
1) You will submit your estimate of Urn X being chosen on the
colored card corresponding to round 1
2) You will be told what the value of your draw is (white or black)
3) You will submit a second estimate of Urn X being chosen on the
reverse side of the card.
(Before making your decisions, you will be informed of previous participants' DRAWS
AND DECISIONS. For example, if you are the third participant, when it is your turn to
move, you will be told what the values of the ¯rst and second participants' draws are, and
what decisions these two participants made after seeing their own draw.)
fBefore making your decisions, you will be informed of previous participants' DRAWS
only (but not their decisions). For example, if you are the third participant, when it is
your turn to move, you will be told what the values of the ¯rst and second participants'
draws are.g
[Before making your decisions, you will be informed of previous participants' DECI-
SIONS only (but not their draws). For example, if you are the third participant, when it is
your turn to move, you will be told what decisions the ¯rst and second participants made
after seeing their own draw.]
Earnings
Your earnings will be calculated as follows. In each round, you will be paid according to
the accuracy of your probability estimate of Urn X being chosen. Here is a table of earnings
per round:












For your information, here is the way the above table was calculated. In each round,
if the probability that you assign to Urn X being chosen is p, you will earn $(2 ¤ p ¡ p2) if
the selected Urn is X, and $(1 ¡ p2) if the selected Urn is Y. This payment schedule has
been calculated so that your expected gains are maximized if you give your true unbiased
estimates of Urn X being chosen.
32At the end of the experiment, ten coin °ips will determine which of the two assess-
ments (before or after seeing the draw) submitted for each of the 10 rounds are to be used
for the purpose of calculating your earnings. Your total earnings will be the sum of your
earnings across these rounds.
Starting the experiment
If you have any questions now or during the rest of the experiment, please raise your hand
and the experimenter will come to your desk and answer them in private.
Otherwise, please follow the information that will be written on the board through
the various stages of the experiment.
Upon completing the experiment further instructions will be provided.
Instructions - Continuation
We are done with the ¯rst part of the experiment. Your earnings were recorded and will
be paid to you at the end of the session.
We will now conduct the second part of the experiment, identical to the ¯rst part,
except for the information that is given to you prior to making your probability assessments.
(Before making your decisions, you will be informed of previous participants' DRAWS
AND DECISIONS. For example, if you are the third participant, when it is your turn to
move, you will be told what the values of the ¯rst and second participants' draws are, and
what decisions these two participants made after seeing their own draw.)
fBefore making your decisions, you will be informed of previous participants' DRAWS
only (but not their decisions). For example, if you are the third participant, when it is
your turn to move, you will be told what the values of the ¯rst and second participants'
draws are.g
[Before making your decisions, you will be informed of previous participants' DECI-
SIONS only (but not their draws). For example, if you are the third participant, when it is
your turn to move, you will be told what decisions the ¯rst and second participants made
after seeing their own draw.]
Once again, we will conduct 10 rounds and your earnings will be determined in the
manner explained in the ¯rst half of the experiment.
33B Appendix: Discussion of the Experimental Setting,
the Payment Scheme, and Risk Neutrality
Discussion
We believe that our setting is optimal for several reasons. First of all, it has been used
many times to study social learning and can allow for direct cross-experiment comparisons.
Second, its simplicity makes it very easy for the participants to understand and for the
experimenters to implement it in a pen-and-paper fashion. Third, for future research, a
large number of simple changes can be applied to it, such as the number of balls in the
urns, the distribution of white and black balls in each urn, the information environment,
etc.
We are conscious of the fact that, in general, people are not very skilled at giving
probabilistic estimates, which could confound our results. Celen and Kariv (2004) study
herds and cascades using a setting where participants choose numbers between -10 and
10. This indeed is easier and requires no prior knowledge of mathematics, but it is very
abstract. We believe that estimating the likelihood of events is something that market
participants have to do at all times. As a result, the Anderson and Holt (1997) setting has
this unique feature of being abstract enough so that simple postulates can be tested but
also realistic enough to be related to real-world situations.
Payment Scheme
As is explained in the instructions, the subjects were rewarded for their probability judg-
ments according to the quadratic scoring rule:
Payment = $(1 ¡ (P(X) ¡ I)
2) where
(
I=1 if X occured
I=0 if Y occured. (17)
It rewards probability judgments, depending on the judgment itself and on the outcome
of the event being forecasted, in a way that induces truthful revelation of probabilities:
participants should optimally reveal the \true" expected value of her subjective probability
distribution regardless of the form of this distribution. However, it assumes risk neutrality.
If a subject is risk averse, the expressed probabilities will be biased toward 0.5. Figure 4
shows the shape of the scoring rule according to whether X or Y was chosen.
We can see from the ¯gure that the scoring rule punishes mistakes very severely and
is quite °at towards the optimal. The result is that subjects therefore do not have the
incentive to use extreme probabilities too frequently and inappropriately. We refer the
interested reader to Kagel and Roth (1997) for more information on scoring rules.
Risk Neutrality
As was just explained, the quadratic scoring rule is only incentive-compatible under risk-
neutrality. However, judging from the behavior of the participants during the experiment
and their answers to a post-experiment questionnaire asking them about their strategy, we
can safely conclude that the pool of participants that we faced had a very wide distribution
of risk-aversion coe±cients.
34Figure 4: The Payment Scheme
A clearly risk-averse participant wrote: \Don't go beyond .3 or .7 [...] never choose
1 or 0". At the other end of the spectrum, a risk-loving subject wrote: \If I was fairly
sure, I guessed 0 or 1". We also observed a couple of subjects who kept on answering 0.5
throughout the rounds, independent of their place in the queue and the previous draws
and forecasts. The reasoning given was: \You would be risking $0.75 for only $0.25".
This leads us to conclude that the participants are not individually risk-neutral, and
this puts in question the payment scheme used. However, it is not clear whether this has a
negative impact on our research question. It may be that the average player is risk-neutral.
Moreover, the impact of risk-aversion or risk-lovingness on the learning e®ects we study
are far from obvious.
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